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IDEAS OF FAIRNESS IN FINANCIAL
SERVICES DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Mary Condon*

1. INTRODUCTION: FAIRNESS IN FINANCIAL

SERVICES
It is a widespread phenomenon in jurisdictions with developed financial services industries that there is some form of organized resolution
process for disputes between consumers and providers of financial services. 1 Most recently, the G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, developed by the Task Force on Financial Consumer
Protection of the OECD Committee on Financial Markets (CMF), includes, as the ninth of ten principles, a principle dealing with "Complaints
Handling and Redress". This principle provides that
[j]urisdictions should ensure that consumers have access to adequate
complaints handling and redress mechanisms that are accessible, independent, fair, accountable, timely and efficient. Such mechanisms
should not impose unreasonable cost, delays or burdens on consumers.
In accordance \vith the above, financial services providers and authorised agents should have in place mechanisms for complaint handling and
redress. Recourse to an independent redress process should be available
to address complaints that are not efficiently resolved via the financial
services providers and authorised agents' internal dispute resolution

*

Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School. York University and Vice-Chair, Ontario
Securities Co~mission. The views expressed in this chapter are personal and do not
represent the views of any regulatory body.
Those of the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are
most often discussed in the literature. but there are others.
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mechanisms. At a minimum, aggregate information with respect to complaints and their resolutions should be made public. 2

In this chapter, I consider the various ways in which the idea of fairness is given content in this dispute resolution regime and try to understand how and why some of these ideas achieve legitimacy and some do
not. A few framing comments should be made. First, the context for the
analysis of fairness in this regime is that of two-party disputes, a context
with which lawyers arc very familiar. On the other hand, the basic premise
of the kinds of dispute resolution services discussed in this chapter is that
they arc outside the fonnal legal system. For example, Gilad argues that
the system of informal dispute resolution practiced by the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) in the United Kingdom is "explicitly designed
to offset some of the advantages enjoyed by RPs [repeat players] in court
litigation". 3 Nor are such processes intended to be directly "regulatory",
in the sense that they are not intended to usurp the role of regulators in
establishing appropriate norms and standards for firm-client interaction
or investigating breaches of regulatory or self-regulatory requirements.
Instead, they are focused on redress for clients on a relatively informal,
case-by-case basis.
The other central point here, and the core of the argument in this
chapter, is that in these two-party disputes, by definition, one of the parties
is always an organization-the financial services firm. 4 This case study of
financial services dispute resolution, therefore, is an opportunity to consider the way in which ideas of fairness arc defined by, and with respect
to, organizations, and specifically in contexts where organizations are pitted against individuals. Docs fairness systematically mean something different to an organization than it means to an individual? Confronting the
question of how organizations "think" about fairness is useful and timely,
not just in the context of the resolution of financial complaints on a granular basis, but more generally in the context of the global financial crisis
Task Force on Financial Consumer Protection of the OECD Committee on Financial
Markets(CMF), G20High-Leve/ Principles on Financial Consumer Protection(October
2011 ). on line: OECD <http://www.oecd.org/regrefonn/liberalisationandcompetition·
interventioninregulatedsectors/4889201 O.pdf>.
Sharon Gilad, "Why the 'Haves' Do Not Necessarily Come Out Ahead in Infonnal
Dispute Resolution" (2010) 32: 3 Law & Policy at 307.
,,
E.g., Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI), "Terms of Reference
(2010), online: OBSI <http://www.obsi.ca/imagcs/Documents/How_We_Work/Tenns_o.f_
Reference/tor_dcc20 l O_ english. pdf> (refer to "participating firm "-that is, those financial
services providers that are members of the OBSI).
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and its aftermath. 5 In the discussion to follow, I consider several alternative definitions of fairness that could be applicable to the situation of infonnal dispute resolution; then I attempt to draw some conclusions about
the relationship between these versions of fairness and the challenge of
ongoing legitimacy for dispute resolution decision-making.

2. EMPIRICAL DESCRIPTION OF FINANCIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS IN
CANADA
I will use the Canadian example as a focus for discussion, recognizing that the legislative and structural context might be different in other
jurisdictions. But I will try to indicate the features of the system that are
common across a number of jurisdictions, as well as where they are different. At the moment, the body that performs external financial dispute
resolution in the financial context in Canada is called the Ombudsman for
Banking Services and Investments (OBSl). 6 It was established in 1996
to review complaints made by customers against banks, and in 2002 was
expanded to include complaints made against investment firms and credit
unions. It is important to note that its formation was not legislated, but
rather, the result of voluntary agreement among members of the financial
services industry. However, in Canada, the two biggest self-regulatory organizations (SRO) within the investment industry7 make it a requirement,
through their rules, that members of the SRO be members of OBSI. In accordance with its terms of reference, the role of the Ombuds is to receive
and investigate complaints and, thereafter, if appropriate, to make recommendations to participating firms and complainants as to the appropriate
resolution of a complaint. 8
The mandate of the Ombuds is to investigate a complaint once the
participating firm has either rejected it or recommended a resolution that
5

6

7

R

See Dimity Kingsford-Smith, "Can There be a Fair Share? Fairness, Regulation, and
Financial Markets" (Chapter 17 of this volume).
See Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI), "About Us", online:
OBSI <http://www.obsi.ca/en/about-us>.
.
See The Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC), onlme:
IJROC <www.iiroc.ca> and The Mutual Fund Dealers Association of Canada (MFDA),
on! ine: MFDA <www.mfda.ca>.
OBSI, supra note 4 (OBSl's tenns ofreference are explicit that the Ombuds is NOT to
provide legal, accounting, or other professional advice).
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the complainant docs not accept. 9 Consideration by OBSI of a complaint
therefore occurs after the firm has investigated internally; that is, it is
only when the complainant is not satisfied with the internal resolution offered by the firm that a complaint will come to OBSI. There is a threshold
amount beyond which the Ombuds may not recommend that a finn pay a
complainant. 10 There arc similar thresholds in other jurisdictions, though
the amounts vary. One standard feature of these kinds of dispute resolution systems is that there is no cost to the complainant of bringing a case
to OBSI for investigation and resolution. Meanwhile, the costs of operating OBSI arc paid out of the membership fees that banking and financial
services members pay to OBSI.
OBSI's "fairness statement" says that it
[r]esolves complaints with a view to what is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances of each individual complaint [but also that it will] resolve complaints using an informal non-legalistic approach taking into
account general principles of good financial services and business practice, law, regulatory policies and guidance, professional body standards
and any relevant code of practice or conduct applicable to the subject
matter of the complaint. 11

A unique feature of the Canadian process is that recommendations
of OBSI that the firm should pay money to an investor to resolve a complaint arc not binding on that firm. 12 OBS I's terms of reference say that if
a firm refuses to accept its recommendation, OBSI should publicly name
that firm and the recommendation made by OBSI. 13 In practice, OBSI has
done this infrequently. Nor, in Canada, is there an appeal mechanism from
an OBSI decision, though this opportunity is available in jurisdictions
such as the United Kingdom.

10

11

c
"

OBSL supra note 4 at s. 9 (certain subject matters for complaints are outside the
Ombuds' mandate~ e.g.• issues related to risk management policies and practices
of a fim1. pricing of financial services. scale of fees or charges generally offered to
customers of the fim1).
That is. no amount greater than CS350.000 in respect of any single complaint.
OBSI. .. OBSI Fairness Statement" (2011 ). online: OBSI <http://ww·w.obsi.ca!images/
Documents How \\'e \\·orkFaimess Statcment'obsi fairness statement_en.pdt>.
OBSI. supra not;4 ats. 2-\.
!Nd at s. '27.
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3. EXAMPLES OF TYPICAL ISSUES THAT
BECOME THE SUBJECT OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES DISPUTES
The Navigator rcport 14 indicates that Canada has a much smaller
number of complaints annually about banking and financial services than,
for example, Australia, even though Australia's population is smaller.'5
The same report notes that investment-related complaints are "on average more complex and costly to investigate than other financial services
complaints". 16 Many of the complaints brought to OBSI by investors in
Canada concern the suitability (or otherwise) of the investments recommended by their dealer or advisor for those investors, in light of relevant
information that should have been collected and deployed by the firm,
such as investors' "risk tolerance", their investment goals, or their financial circumstances. Particular features of investments recommended by
advisors, such as the sales charges payable or the appropriateness of a
particular "risk rating" for a financial product, are a recurring source of
complaint. More specific problems have related to the methodology that
is used by OBSI to determine how much compensation to recommend
for the investor in the event that a financial recommendation is made. For
example, should investors be compensated for lost opportunities if it is
determined some years later that certain investments were inappropriate?
Other conundrums revolve around the principles to be applied if a dealer
recommended products to clients "off-book", that is to say, beyond the
ambit of the products approved to be sold by the firm as a whole. This
issue is a source of particular tension for firms in the sense that the individual advisor or dealer may be found to be operating outside the ambit of
her or his employment, but the firm is nevertheless ultimately called upon
to satisfy OBSI's recommendation, if any, in favour of the client.
As is evident from the discussion above, in resolving many of
these disputes, there is a need for some kind of "investigation'' as to the
positions of both sides, as well as, in some cases, an assessment of the
14

15
16

Navigator Company, Ombudsman for Banking and Financial Services and !nve.:tments
Report, 2011 Independent Review (20 I I), online: OBSI <~~://www.obst.ca/~age~
Documents/Ind Rev/independent review_of_obsi_20I J.pdf> (this ts an external re~icwe~ s
report on OBSl The Dispute Re~lution Committee of Canada's Joint Forum of Fman~ial
Market Regulators, which is currently the group of regulators responsible for overseeing
OBSI, requires such a review to take place evety three years).
Ibid at 19.
Ibid at l 0.
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credibility of the story provided by one side or the other. This process
serves to further blur the line between these sorts of dispute resolution
processes and the types of activities engaged in by internal, firm-based,
regulatory compliance and/or enforcement processes or the civil courts. It
also, as I argue later, calls into question the credibility of OBSI to perform
these activities in the absence of the usual institutional and nonnative
structures provided by the official legal system, such as rules of evidence,
norms for determining credibility, damages rules, and so on.

4. FAIRNESS AS PROCESS?
There is an explicit continuum between consistency of decisionmaking and fairness expressed in OBSl's fairness statement. Thus, the
statement indicates that the OBSI will
[r]esolve complaints in accordance with externally reviewed policies and procedures to ensure consistency of approach and outcome in
similar complaints. Notwithstanding this, the fairness objective is paramount and the Ombudsman shall not be bound by any previous OBSI
rccommendation. 17

OBSI publishes on its Web site a variety of "case studies" that are
presumably intended to illustrate how the organization handles a variety
of factual scenarios. It has also recently consulted with stakeholders about
its approach to determining the quantum of losses suffered by an investor
and the circumstances in which it will determine that an advisor gave unsuitable investment advice to a client. As noted, OBSI explicitly prioritizes its "fairness objective" at the expense of consistency. Thus, it indicates
that the case studies on its Web site arc "not intended to set precedcnts". 18
Gilad argues that debates about the adequacy of these forms of
dispute resolution stem from a divergence of interests among individual complainants and firms. She argues that individuals typically want
"individualized justice", whereas organizations want rulcs. 19 This point
recognizes that there is a structural difference between an individual complainant and the organization on the other side of the dispute.
17
18

19

OBSI, supra note 11.
See OBSI, Case Studies Web page, online: OBSI <www.obsi.ca>.
Gilad, supra note 3 at 283 (specifically, she argues that "the typically indetenninate
nature of informal dispute resolution settings renders them less susceptible to large
organizations' and other repeat players' capacity to 'play for rules"').
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Organizations want to be able to plan and to achieve predictability, as adverse decisions by an organization such as the OBSI not only have negative reputational effects, but also affect how advisors are trained and calls
into question the adequacy of the firm's internal compliance processes.
Meanwhile, clients are interested in redress on a one-time only basis, with
a high degree of attention paid to context-specific elements. Yet, the subject matter of the dispute is typically about the relationship that has been
forged between these two participants with varying interests at play and
varying perspectives on the appropriate outcome.
It was noted above how OBSI attempts to define the content of the
fairness standards it imposes. Crucially, that content includes but goes beyond the legal standards imposed by courts, regulators, or professional
bodies, to consider "general principles of good financial services and
business practice". In other words, not only does this sort of dispute resolution prioritize individualized fairness as opposed to consistency with
prior OBSI recommendations, but those recommendations are based on
the interpretation of norms that are not limited to the ones enshrined in
legal precedent or current regulatory requirements. In this sense, a wellestablished process is subordinated to the achievement of substantive
outcomes, on the theory that individual complainants are vulnerable to
20
disadvantage when dealing with sophisticated, well-financed firms. But
one result of this approach is that OBSI cannot necessarily look to legal
precedent to provide justification for the results it recommends, but must
seek credibility for its decision-making from other sources.

5. FAIRNESS AS OUTCOME?
Meanwhile, the Canadian Ombuds service stresses that its work does
not necessarily result in most of its decisions being in favour of the consumer. Data from the Navigator report indicates that the ratio of "overall
decision win/loss for industry" was 71129 in Canada, based on the 2010
annual report of OBSI.21 Apparently, the fact that firms win many m.ore
cases than they lose does not give the organizations that are the subject
20

21

An example is that OBSI's investigation may go beyond the information r~cord~d
on the foundational know J'Our client form filled in at the outset of the relationship
f on about that
. · 1 · cbetween the investor and the advisor, so as to uncover a dd it1ona m iorma 1
investor's financial circumstances or investment goals.
.
. .
Navigator Company, supra note 14 (comparative figures for indu~try wm/loss ratios m
Australia and the United Kingdom were 61/39 and 50/50, respectively).
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of complaints much comfort. Despite the possibility that these numbers
could be interpreted by finns to mean that OBSI's investigations mostly
turn out to support the firm's "side of the story", their concerns about the
uncertainty of those outcomes remain. 22 Clearly, part of the concern derives from the costs associated with the operations of OBSI, which the
Navigator report indicates is pitched at $7,158 per complaint, higher
than either Australia ($4,320) or the United Kingdom ($902). The Navigator report attributes this higher cost in part to the greater willingness
of OBSI to "investigate" complaints as compared to their international
counterparts.
Perhaps more surprisingly, the trend whereby individual complainants "lose" more matters than they win is not a subject of persistent dissatisfaction by individual investors or investor advocates. This trend is
despite the fact that the stakes could be high for complainants if the investment disputes at issue relate to their retirement portfolios, and particularly if the discovery of shortcomings in handling investment accounts
is belated.

6. ATTRIBUTES OF FAIR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION?
The argument of this chapter so far has been that neither an interpretation of fairness as a particular prescriptive, rule-oriented process
to be followed, nor an interpretation that focuses on who wins and who
loses, has been successful at quelling ongoing dissatisfaction with external financial dispute resolution in Canada. In the first case, one side has
a radically different understanding of a fair process than the other does.
In the second, neither side appears to regard win/loss rates as particularly
relevant to an assessment of how well external dispute resolution works
in practice. This perception raises the question of whether there are other
indicia of fairness that might be more universally persuasive. 23
At least two possibilities suggest themselves. One involves the notion of the independence of the decision-maker, and the other relates to the
transparency of the decisions made. With respect to the first, it has been
noted above that one of the high-level principles developed by the OECD
22
23

lbidat8, 11, 13, 15, 16.
Sec Mark E. Warren, "Democracy and the Everyday Origins of Fairness" (Chapter I of
this volume).
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with respect to financial consumer protection referenced the need for
complaint handling systems that are independent. An interesting question,
therefore, is whether, if a decision-maker is perceived to be independent
and impartial as between both sides to a dispute, would it matter that the
norms used to decide outcomes were more open-ended, or individualized
than, for example, a legal system would support? In other words, it is
possible that independence of perspective and open-mindedness may be
valuable in and of itself, as a source of credibility for the decision-maker.
In advancing this argument, I am cognizant of the cautionary note sounded by Gilad's work, in which she calls for interrogation of the "heuristics"
used by financial dispute decision-makers. 24 Examples of such heuristics
include factors such as whether the complainant was represented, whether
the complainant was a repeat complainant, and whether, in general, the
complainant was perceived as "worthy" or "unworthy". 25 Equivalent
heuristics that reference characteristics of financial services firms could
also be interrogated. What Gilad's argument points to is that an independence of perspective cannot be assumed, but must be demonstrated to exist
through actual decisions rendered.
This latter point implicates the other possible indicia of fairness,
which is the transparency of the decisions made. In this regard, it has been
noted above that OBSI 's terms of reference provide that the investigation
and outcome of specific complaints is confidential, at least until such time
as the Ombuds decides to "name and shame" a firm that has not accepted
its recommendation. 26 One significant consequence of the lack of transparency attendant on OBSI's investigative and decision-making processes
is that it prevents any systematic reassessment of the decision-making
practices deployed, 27 including whether or not OBSI did in fact maintain
its impartiality in the process of coming to a recommendation, or alt~rna
tively whether it adopted particular working assumptions of co~plamant
or firm characteristics in its decision-making. In other words, it may be
an underlying structural problem for this dispute resolution system that
the decision-making engaged in cannot be evaluated by observers for the
presence of features that would make it more generally acceptable.
24
25
26

21

Gilad, supra note 3 at 284.
Ibid.
OBSI, supra note 4 at ss.18-20 (Section 28 of the tenns of reference does allo~ for
public annual reporting by OBSI as to its activities, and reasons for the r~comn:endattons
of OBSI in individual cases are provided to the parties on a confide~ttal ~asts). f h
N .
h · th
text of a review like that o t e
av1gator Company, supra note 14 (other t an m econ
Navigator Report, which occurs every three years).
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CONCLUSION: THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FAIRNESS AND LEGITIMACY

The argument of this chapter has been that, in this example of financial services decision-making, one of the disputing sides ascribes a
different content to fairness than the other side docs. For the participating
finns involved, fairness resides in the ability to count on known patterns
of behaviour deployed by the Ombuds service, predictability of outcome
and, relatedly, to conformity with other systems for dispute resolution,
notably court-based systems. For the organizations involved in these disputes, there arc multiple processes at issue, such as internal complaint
handling protocols, OBSI investigations and recommendations, potential
SRO arbitrations, court-based adjudication, and so on. Not only that, but
these organizations obviously have considerations at play other than the
fairness of dispute resolution processes, including operational cost, efficiency, and overall profitability.
None of these considerations is an issue for the individual complainant on the other side of these disputes. Yet, the normative justification
for the existence of a dispute resolution process like the one described
above is precisely that individual complainants will be disadvantaged by
the requirement to mobilize the more formal mechanisms available, not
only because of how much these processes would cost the complainant,
but because typically the amount of losses incurred would not justify the
expenditure required, from a cost-benefit point of view.
Ultimately, I argue that resolving this impasse of competing definitions of fairness may require a closer look at other, foundational ways of
ascribing content to the idea of fairness in external dispute resolution, beyond a focus on comparisons with the traditional attributes of legal-type
processes, or on typical outcomes. Two possible forms of normative commitment that could hold some promise of rendering financial dispute resolution more enduringly legitimate have been briefly canvassed. Further
evaluation of the merits of these interpretations of fairness in the specific
context of informal dispute resolution may even hold broader promise for
the assessment of post-crisis financial systems more generally.

